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Introduction
What role did secular terms of trade changes and its volatility play in explaining the level and variance of country growth rates between 1870 and 1938? A decade ago, William Easterly, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett and Larry Summers (1993) offered an insightful observation: all the contending fundamental determinants of growth --institutions, geography and culture --exhibit far more persistence over time than do the growth rates they are supposed to explain. So, where do we search for exogenous shocks that might account for the variance around those persistent fundamentals? Exogenous relative price shocks associated with the external terms of trade seem to be one good place to look, especially during world episodes of global integration (or disintegration) when commodity prices converge (or diverge) world wide, inducing large terms of trade changes and economy-wide responses. Most of the modern empirical analysis on the growth and terms of trade connection has exploited recent evidence, where world commodity price convergence has been more modest (Findlay and O'Rourke 2003) . In contrast, the classic Prebisch-Singer debate focused on the century before 1950, a period that included the first global century up to 1913 and the autarky that followed, seven decades of dramatic commodity relative price change.
It is also true that specialization in the production and export of primary products has proven to be one of the most enduring and robust determinants of poor economic growth (Sala-iMartin 1997; Sachs and Warner 2001) . However, the reason for this "resource curse" relationship is poorly understood. Institutional or geographic features might foster natural resource dependence. Or we could have it the other way around: natural resource activities might fail to encourage the right sort of linkages, institutions or incentives for economic development (Tornell and Velasco 1992; Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003) .
Perhaps, but could it also be that the relationship between natural resource dependence and growth is somehow related to the terms of trade? Could the prices of primary products be more volatile or trend differently than manufactures, and could this behavior somehow be tied to growth performance? This paper will use country experience both in the core and in the periphery and over the seven decades before World War II to investigate whether variations in macroeconomic performance can be attributed to secular change and volatility in the terms of trade. Following Easterly et al.(1993) , we will focus on just one aspect of macroeconomic performance, GDP per capita growth rates. This paper is not the first to explore this relationship. In 1950 Raoul Prebisch and Hans Singer argued that developing countries in the periphery (which exported primary products and imported manufactures) had experienced both declining terms of trade and stagnating incomes, and that the two phenomena were causally related. More recently, economists have begun to argue that both terms of trade trends and volatility are related to economic growth. The economics seems simple enough: a secular improvement in the terms of trade leads to higher levels of investment, and hence long-run economic growth, while higher volatility in the terms of trade reduces investment, and hence growth, because of aversion to risk (Mendoza 1995 (Mendoza , 1997 Deaton and Miller 1996; Kose and Reizman 2001; Bleaney and Greenway 2001 ).
In addition, one might well expect to find asymmetry between core and periphery. If the secular increase in the terms of trade reinforces comparative advantage, then it induces more industrialization in the core and less industrialization in the periphery. If industrialization is the central carrier of growth, the secular terms of trade improvement should raise (long run) growth rates in the core but lower them in the periphery. Similarly, rich countries with more sophisticated institutions and markets are likely to have cheaper ways to insure against price volatility than poor countries, so terms of trade instability is likely to have a far bigger negative impact in the periphery than the core. This paper examines these hypotheses relating the terms of trade and growth using data for 35 countries over the years 1870 to 1938. 1 The 35-country sample covers about 85 percent of the world population in 1900, and it includes five industrial leaders (the USA, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK), three rich European offshoots (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), nine
European industrial late comers (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Spain and Russia), eight primary product exporters in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay), and ten primary product exporters in Asia and the Middle East (Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Siam and Turkey).
Using new terms of trade evidence, Figure 1 plots terms of trade trends across the five regions. Note first the substantial variation across regions, and that a clear distinction between core and periphery stands out: the core industrial leaders had rising terms of trade throughout the seven decades; the periphery had no rise, and, indeed, Latin America and Asia both underwent a long run decline. 2 However, none of the regional secular trends appear to look very dramatic. As we will see later in this paper, time-series analysis of country terms of trade provides very weak support for a declining terms of trade in the periphery over the full seven decades. Regardless of trend, however, we will see below that secular changes in the terms of trade had an impact on growth in the periphery, but not in the core.
Figure 2 compares terms of trade volatility across these 35 countries in three sub-periods, measured by the standard deviation. 3 Generally, the industrial countries had lower terms of trade volatility than did those in the periphery: only Germany and Italy are over towards the right, and all of that is due to terms of trade volatility late in the period. Generally, the Asian and Latin American primary product exporters had higher terms of trade volatility than did the European core and its offshoots: only India, Burma and Peru are over towards the left. There are standard explanations for that observed asymmetry in volatility, and they apply to our period as well.
Figure 3 looks at the volatility of different primary products. Clearly, not all commodities were created with equal stability since some exhibit far greater volatility than others. 4 To make matters worse for the periphery, primary producers tend to have much higher commodity concentration ratios, a second factor that accounts for the differences in volatility in country terms of trade between core and periphery, and even within the periphery. But is higher volatility associated with lower growth? Figure 4 plots average annual GDP growth rates and terms of trade volatility between 1870 and 1939, and visual inspection suggests considerable support for the hypothesis that terms of trade instability lowers growth performance, even when the relationship is unconditioned by other forces. Yet, not all countries in the periphery were just primary product exporters. Many, as time went by, began to export textiles and fuels. 5 This can be seen in Table 2 , which documents the level of primary product export 3 Throughout this paper we measure terms of trade volatility by the standard deviation. There is no need to divide by mean values since all the terms of trade series are indexed on the same base year. 4 Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) called this the "commodity lottery" when reviewing Latin American experience in the 1930s. 5 An even more dramatic retreat from export concentration and high primary product export shares has taken place in the Third World since 1970. The World Bank reports for all "developing" countries that manufactures rose from only 17.4 percent of commodity exports in 1970 to 64.3 percent by 1994. Enough of the Third World is now labor-abundant and natural-resource-scarce so that the growth of trade has helped it industrialize. It appears that the classic image of Third World specialization in primary products is obsolescing (Lindert and Williamson 2003: p. 249) .
shares in total exports (or primary product concentration) for the countries in the periphery.
Variance in primary product concentration may help account for the lack of an even stronger unconditional correlation between volatility and growth in Figure 4 . In addition, the size of the export sector must have mattered. Given the same terms of trade volatility, countries with higher X/GDP ratios would have suffered bigger falls in GDP per capita growth, if our hypothesis is successful. Essentially, multivariate empirical analysis is needed to explore these relationships.
Therefore, this paper looks at cross-country growth regressions with secular terms of trade changes and volatility as explanatory variables, and with export shares (lagged) and primary product concentration (lagged) as controls. What we find confirms our hypotheses: terms of trade volatility had a negative impact on growth in the periphery, but not in the core; and secular terms of trade growth had a positive impact on growth, but it was much weaker in the periphery than in the core. Does the strong explanatory power of terms of trade behavior on growth survive the inclusion of primary product export concentration and export shares in GDP as control variables?
Indeed, they do. Something fundamental about natural resources links them to slow growth. The resource curse stands.
The next section reviews the alternative theories linking the terms of trade to economic development. Section 3 offers our empirical specification and the data. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
Theory

Terms of Trade Volatility and Economic Growth
In the introduction to his famous 1950 article, Hans Singer proposed that fluctuations in the terms of trade dramatically affected the funds available to underdeveloped countries for capital formation, and hence growth. He noted that changes in the volume and value of foreign trade tend to be important in underdeveloped countries because their surplus income over subsistence is often entirely dependent on export revenues, and investment is in turn dependent on these income These studies point to a potentially robust negative relationship between economic growth and terms of trade volatility. The channel favored by the literature seems to be through investment and uncertainty. Moreover, the results carry over to a sample of developing countries where investment often comes from abroad, not domestically. All of the above papers, however, cover no more than two or three decades and focus on the last third of the twentieth century. It seems to us instructive to examine these results over a longer period, and during an era when primary product exports dominated the periphery even more than they do today.
Terms of Trade Trends and Economic Growth
The literature on the relationship between economic growth and secular trends in the terms of trade is older and more contentious than that on the impact of terms of trade volatility. In fact, there is no really well-articulated theory, let alone consensus, on the growth effects of longterm trends in the terms of trade.
One set of voices predict a positive correlation between terms of trade and income growth. Just above we noted Singer's observation that increases in the terms of trade can provide surpluses for long-term capital accumulation. The empirical studies reviewed seem to provide support for this position (Bleaney and Greenway 2001; Kose and Reizman 2001; Mendoza 1997; Deaton and Miller 1996) . This claim, however, is not the one for which Singer's paper is most famous.
In 1950, along with Raoul Prebisch, Singer emphasized instead that the fundamental nature of primary products and manufactures would, in the long run, cause primary product prices to fall relative to those of manufactures. Primary product specializing countries would therefore see deterioration in their terms of trade and, as producers of increasingly cheaper primary products and consumers of increasingly expensive manufactures, a relative fall in incomes. The
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis obviously hinges on the premise that primary product commodity prices will tend to fall relative to those of manufacturing over time. Prebisch and Singer argued that manufacturing sectors generated monopoly profits, and that these profits would eventually translate into real wage increases. Commodity markets, on the other hand, would see productivity gains translated into a decrease in prices, rather than a rise in wages. Why? Because most commodity markets are perfectly competitive, and demand for commodities is income-inelastic.
If elastic labor supplies were present in underdeveloped countries, they would only exacerbate the problem (Lewis 1978: pp. 14-20) .
The influence of structural differences between manufacturing and primary production on the terms of trade has received some recent theoretical and empirical support. John Spraos (1983) develops a theoretical model where, for a group of price and income inelastic commodities, developing countries can be trapped by the specialization they inherited from previous generations. In Prebisch-Singer style, productivity gains are translated into price decreases rather than wage increases. More recently, Harry Bloch and David Sapsford (2000) develop a model of price determination in primary product and manufacturing sectors, where wages and prices in primary production are treated as competitively determined while those in manufacturing are determined by mark-up pricing and union-employer bargaining. Using price and wage data from the post-World War II period they find support for the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis of declining prices of primary products relative to those of manufactures.
Other theories also predict a negative correlation between the terms of trade and growth, but for different reasons. Jeffrey Andrew Warner (1995, 2001) , for example, note that countries with great natural wealth tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries:
natural resources, and any terms of trade boom that raises their value, are therefore a "curse" to development. In cross-country regressions, specialization in primary products has proven to be one of the most robust determinants of slow economic growth (Sala-i-Martin 1997) . No one theory of the natural resource curse is universally accepted, however. Sachs and Warner use the more popular "crowding-out" logic, whereby primary production crowds out growth-enhancing alternative activities. They suggest that manufactures production is the crowded out activity in many resource-rich economies. A political economy approach offers an alternative to the crowding-out theory. Thus, Anne Krueger (1974) famously argued that rent-seeking was a growth-suppressing tendency of resource-owning elites in poor countries. More concretely, Aaron
Tornell and Andres Velasco (1992) suggest that resource rich poor countries have undeveloped property rights, so that gains (in particular rents) are transferred to rich countries for safekeeping.
Hence terms of trade booms translate into capital flight.
There is some evidence to support the proposed negative correlation between secular terms of trade improvements and economic growth in the primary-product-producing periphery.
Yael Hadass and Jeffrey Williamson (2003) , for example, find that while terms of trade movements between 1870 and World War I favored primary product exporters, it reduced their growth. They also find strong evidence of asymmetry in growth impact between core and periphery. Their sample, however, covers few of the developing countries that remained poor up to World War II, and they did not explore the influence of volatility. A large sample of underdeveloped countries has yet to be used to test the influence of terms of trade growth and volatility during the period that motivated the Prebisch-Singer debate in the first place.
Empirical Specification and Data
Following the research strategy of Mendoza (1997) , we examine the relationship between economic growth and changes in the level and the volatility of the terms of trade in ten-year periods over a span of seven decades, 1870-1938.
Empirical Strategy
Specifically, we regress 10-year average GDP per capita growth rates on 10-year average terms of trade growth and the 10-year standard deviation of terms of trade, controlling for initial income per capita, export shares, primary product export shares in total exports and a variety of other variables. The basic regression model is as follows:
for country i and decade t. GRy is the 10-year average growth rate in GDP per capita in percentage units, GRTOT represents the 10-year average growth in the terms of trade (also in percentage units), SDTOT is the standard deviation of the terms of trade over the 10-year interval, and ln y is the natural log of GDP per capita in the first year of the decade. Other control variables, represented above by the X vector, include the share of primary product exports in total exports, which we will refer to by PP/X, and the export share in GDP, denoted X/GDP. We will also interact variables in the X vector with GRTOT and SDTOT. Export concentration is not included here since its alleged impact is already embedded in the measured SDTOT. To test for asymmetry, we will break the sample up into center and periphery, and within each include the interaction with the share of primary product exports in total exports. To control for multiplier effects, we will also interact terms of trade growth and volatility with initial export shares in GDP. The data for the pre-World War II period is not sufficiently comprehensive to add most of the explanatory variables typical of the new empirical growth literature. However, we do not see this as a shortcoming since our purpose is to account for the deviation of growth rates around some steady state, and while understanding fundamentals driving that steady state is not the motivation here, we do impose country fixed effects to capture all of those fundamentals. In any case, we will also control for primary school enrollment rate. We experimented with the growth in the land-labor ratio (as a measure of changing endowments, suggested by Hadass and Williamson 2003) , and with various measures of openness (tariff rates, local railway networks, and transport costs from port to port), but since their inclusion had no effect on our variables of interest they are omitted from the reported regressions. Finally, and as mentioned above, we include time and country fixed effects (represented by Y and Z above) in order to control for unobserved characteristics in countries and decades.
Data
Appendix 1 lists the sources and method of construction of all the variables used in this paper. Still, given the centrality of the growth and the terms of trade data to our investigation, it is worth discussing here the principal sources and techniques used in their construction. In addition,
we start by defining membership in core and periphery.
Defining Core and Periphery
Our 35 countries must be allocated between core and periphery. The allocation is achieved by applying three criteria: the share of exports primary products; level of development;
and achieving similar sample sizes. The allocation has resulted in the following: Core = 19 = 4 industrial leaders (France, Germany, UK, USA), 5 rich European "frontier" offshoots (Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Uruguay), and 10 European industrial late comers (AustriaHungary, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Russia); Periphery = 16 = 6 primary product exporters in Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Peru), and 10 primary product exporters in Asia and the Middle East (Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Siam, Turkey).
GDP Per Capita Data
For most countries in our sample, the primary source of the GDP per capita estimates (in 1990 $US) is Angus Maddison (1995 use decadal rather than annual regressions. They will also give a better fix on long run effects.
The Terms of Trade Data
The net barter terms of trade is, of course, defined as the ratio of export to import prices.
It is not meant to be a welfare measure, but rather an index of the relative price shocks to which the economy must adjust. Seven of our sampled European or European offshoot countries have excellent terms of trade data, but this is not true of the rest. Thus, we constructed new terms of trade series for the remaining twenty-eight, sixteen of which being commodity-exporting countries in the periphery. Formally, for product i, country j, and period t.
These TOT estimates differ from series generated by previous scholars in three key however, suggest that the assumption closely approximates reality. Moreover, Kose and Riezman (2001) suggest that the use of such a price index is superior to an import index when examining the effects of trade shocks, and that such an index exhibits similar (albeit slightly higher) levels of volatility compared with a pure terms of trade measure.
Given the extensive, and some would say exhaustive, effort that has gone into the construction of existing US and European terms of trade series, we have opted to employ terms of trade indices from traditional secondary sources for the industrial core and the European offshoots. These traditional sources have not necessarily been constructed using the same price sources and weighting schemes, and so are not strictly comparable to our indices constructed for the periphery. Since the primary object of our investigation are the periphery countries --the core countries will be considered for comparative proposes only, we do not think differences in terms of trade construction pose a serious problem. Moreover, construction techniques seem broadly similar and hence fairly comparable. These and other aspects of the terms of trade data are described further in Appendix 1.
The Results
The impact of both the secular changes and the volatility of the terms of trade are estimated in Table 3 . Note that the results are reported for both the full seven decades and for that portion of the periphery's terms of trade experience that was the prime focus of Prebisch and Singer (1890-1938) . In both cases, we omit the decade of World War I for the reasons discussed earlier. Regarding hypothesis testing, the qualitative results do not differ at all between the shorter and the longer period (although significance is somewhat better for the 1890-1938 period since, one supposes, the data are better). Note also that the results are reported separately for core and periphery, thus making it possible to test the asymmetry hypothesis. Table   3 is estimated using country and time fixed effects for the reasons offered earlier, namely it makes it possible for us to control for the (unobserved) fundamentals that were also determining growth performance, fundamentals that are not the focus of this paper. The unit of observation is a decade, and thus the dependent variable is average annual growth over some decade for the country in question. Similarly, % ToT refers to the growth (or decline) in the terms of trade over that decade while sd ToT is the average volatility of the terms of trade over the decade. The other independent variables (ln GDP per capita, PP/X, X/GDP, % Kids in School) are taken from the first year of that decade, in an effort to avoid problems of causality and endogeneity. 8 In the periphery, we have data for every country and every decade, giving us 96 (=16x6) observations.
There are a few missing observations in the core, leaving us with 110 observations, as opposed to 114 (=19x6) that would be in a complete dataset.
Regarding controls, here are the key results. First, there was strong conditional convergence in both regions, the coefficient on initial GDP per capita being negative, significant and of considerable economic size. However, this result is for country fixed effects, so it refers to convergence after controlling for the fundamentals. We know, of course, that those fundamentals differed so dramatically across these countries that (unconditional) divergence took place "big time" before 1938 (Pritchett 1997; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002) , so we do not find the estimated conditional convergence very interesting. Second, enrollment rates did not have a significant impact on growth performance. Indeed, the only time the enrollment rate is significant (periphery, 1890-1938) , it is of the wrong sign. 9 Third, natural resources were not an unambiguous "curse" by themselves: only for the periphery 1890-1938 was primary product specialization (e.g. large PP/X) associated with poor growth. What made primary product specialization a curse for the low-income economy in the periphery was how that specialization influenced the terms of trade.
To identify terms of trade effects properly, we interact it with the other conditions that we argued earlier should have mattered. Thus, while % ToT has by itself a positive impact on GDP growth (but significantly so only for the periphery), and while it is especially big for those countries with big trade shares (but significantly so only for the periphery), the impact of % ToT is negative when interacted with PP/X. Thus, those countries specializing in primary product exports received smaller beneficial effects from terms of trade gains than did those specializing in manufactured exports (and especially so within the periphery). The critical question is whether that offset was big enough to swamp all other positive terms of trade effects, and an answer to 9 There are two possible explanations for this apparently perverse result: the influence of schooling is already captured by country fixed effects; and/or the schooling data are poor for the periphery before 1938.
that question will emerge when in Table 4 we add up the three coefficients on variables including % ToT, using appropriate weights.
Note that the asymmetry hypothesis is borne out powerfully in Table 3 . Indeed, nowhere in Table 3 does the terms of trade have a significant effect on growth in the core, either for secular change or for volatility. In contrast, for the periphery the terms of trade coefficient is significant four out of five times for 1870-1938, and always significant for 1890-1938.
Finally, Table 3 suggests that terms of trade volatility had a far more powerful negative impact on growth in the periphery than did secular trends. To see this more clearly, we need to add up % ToT and sd ToT effects. Table 4 uses mean values of our explanatory variables and the estimated coefficients from Table 3 to assess the marginal and actual impact of both % ToT and sd(ToT). The marginal impact represents the impact of a one-unit increase in either secular change or volatility on income growth. For % ToT, for example, it is the sum of the coefficient estimates on % ToT, % ToT x PP/X and % ToT x X/GDP using as weights for the interacted terms mean values of PP/X and X/GDP. 10 The actual impact calculates the full impact of terms of trade behavior by multiplying each coefficient estimate by the observed mean value of the corresponding explanatory variable for the region and period in question. Thus differences in marginal impact relate to country structural attributes that would generate different responses to the same terms of trade movement, while differences in actual impact reflect both structural elements as well as the actual terms of trade experience of each region.
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Looking at Table 4 , an immediate finding is that the actual impact calculations strongly support the asymmetry hypothesis. Over the full 1870-1938 period, secular changes in the terms of trade served to diminish GDP per capita growth rates in the periphery (by 0.2 percentage 10 Marginal impact would obviously be just the coefficient estimate if our regression model included only the linear terms of % ToT and sd ToT without the interaction terms. Doing this for the periphery for 1870-1938, the coefficient estimates are 0.047 for % ToT and -0.66 for sd ToT with t-statistics of 0.51 and -1.66 respectively. Table 4 shows that the marginal impacts calculated from the model used in Table 3 for the same region and period are 0.153 and -0.046 each with much greater statistical significance. We interpret these results to mean that there is an important role for the interaction terms in understanding the impact of terms of trade movements.
points) but not in the core. Over the same period, terms of trade volatility also served to diminish growth rates in the periphery (by 0.5 percentage points), but not in the core. Further inspection of Table 4 shows that both differences in terms of trade movements and in marginal impact of terms of trade are responsible for the regional asymmetry in actual impact. That is, the periphery stood to gain from positive trends in terms of trade but the terms of trade deteriorated, producing a negative total impact on growth. In contrast, terms of trade had little impact in the core, both because of the small magnitude of the secular trends, and also because the underlying structure of the economies made the marginal impact small. Similarly, the marginal impact of terms of trade volatility was significantly negative in the periphery while it was zero in the core. The gap in actual impact was, again, further widened by the fact that terms of trade was more volatile in the periphery.
Second, the negative impact on growth from terms of trade volatility was two and a half times greater than from secular trends (-0.501 versus -0.201). Further, the economic effects were big. Terms of trade trends and volatility combined served to lower annual growth rates in the periphery by more than 0.7 percentage points, a very big number when compared with the mean growth rate in the periphery 1870-1938 of 0.8 percent per annum ( 
Concluding Remarks
Consistent with recent studies of modern cross-country growth performance, our analysis of a near century of pre-World War II data has shown that terms of trade movements were a very important determinant of country economic performance. They were especially important in the periphery where those less developed countries were, according to our empirical analysis, much more sensitive to terms of trade trends and volatility than was true of industrial countries in the core. The secular deterioration in the terms of trade experienced by the periphery represented a significant drag on income growth during those seven decades 1870-1938. But even more damaging to the primary product producers in the periphery was the high degree of volatility in the terms of trade that exerted a negative impact on growth more than twice the size of the negative impact of the trend. The two combined served to halve the growth performance of the periphery.
What is especially notable about our findings is the presence of striking asymmetry between the core and the periphery. While the terms of trade appears to have played an important role in explaining (disappointing) growth performance in the less industrialized periphery, neither trends nor volatility seems to have mattered much in the more industrial core, despite the fact that volatility was almost as high in the core as in the periphery. Exactly what was it about the more 12 Because the regression model includes interaction terms, we need to make an assumption about the covariance between the interacted variables. We assume a zero covariance, so that, for example, we obtain a counterfactual value for % ToT x PP/X by simply multiplying the observed mean value of % ToT of the core and PP/X of the periphery. We believe this is reasonable because comparing the mean of the interaction term with the means of the interacted variables separately suggests that the covariance is small. Further, one of the independent variables, X/GDP, varies very little across the regions, implying that our assumption is likely to be innocuous.
industrialized countries that allowed them to escape the damaging consequences of terms of trade instability, an escape that was apparently unavailable to primary product exporters, most of whom were in the periphery? Did the industrialized economies have a better mechanism by which to insure against adverse shocks? Were international capital markets important for smoothing accumulation performance, and were these more accessible to core countries? Similarly, why was it that countries in the core did not benefit much when the terms of rose, or suffer much when they fell? Finally, while we have taken the terms of trade to be exogenous, future work might be advised to explore the deeper question: What were the sources of the cross-country differences in terms of trade trends and volatility? In particular, why did some countries experience large swings in terms of trade while others enjoyed greater stability?
Our next step will be to assess the channel of impact that we have assumed here to be accumulation. We have in hand a data set that documents British capital exports to all of the countries in our sample up to 1913 (Clemens and Williamson 2003) , after which global capital markets fall apart. A future version of this paper will speak to this issue by reporting the influence of terms of trade volatility on the late 19 th century allocation of British capital across recipient countries. In the meantime, we hope that this paper will persuade others to turn their attention to the country impact of terms of trade shocks -rather than just the shocks themselves. Maddison (1995) , GDP per capita is calculated by dividing a country's income (in 1990 US dollars) by population in every year. Sources of the population data have been described elsewhere in this appendix, and the sources of the income estimates follow.
Appendix 1: The Data
Data for Argentina after 1890 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date, GDP per capita is assumed to grow at the same year-on-year rate as the estimates of Argentine real wages found in Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1995 , it is assumed that the ratio declined annually at a constant rate. Before 1914, it is assumed that real GDP per capita grew at the same rate as did the ratio of the real value of British colonial revenue from Ceylon to the population of the Island. A full series of annual nominal colonial revenues and population figures come from the 1905 and 1914 editions of the annual Ceylon Blue Book, a statistical publication of the colonial administration in Colombo. Some of these figures were recorded in rupees, and are converted to pounds sterling using conversion rates from Bryan Taylor II, 2000, Encyclopedia of Global Financial Markets, Global Financial Data, Los Angeles, California (online at http://www.globalfindata.com). The resulting figures are converted to real pounds sterling using the deflator in McCusker op. cit.
Data for Chile after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Chile grew at the same year-on-year rate as did our estimates of Argentine GDP per capita.
Data for Colombia after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date, it is assumed that that GDP per capita grew at an unweighted average of the growth rates for Mexico and Brazil between 1850 and 1900 given in Coatsworth op. cit.
Estimates for Data for Peru after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Peru grew at the same year-on-year rate as did our estimates of Argentine GDP per capita.
Data for the Philippines after 1900 come from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Philippine GDP per capita grew at the same year-on-year rate as our estimates for Siam.
Estimates for Serbia after 1890 come from Foreman-Peck and Lains, op. cit. Before 1890 GDP per capita is assumed to grow at the same year-on-year rate as it did between 1890 and 1913.
Estimates for Turkey after 1913 come from Maddison. Before this date it is assumed that GDP per capita grew at the same year-on-year rate as did estimates of Turkish real wages from Jeffrey Williamson, 2000, "Real wages and relative factor prices around the Mediterranean, 1500-1940," in Şevket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds. The Mediterranean Response to Globalization Before 1950, Routledge, New York.
Data for Uruguay after 1882 comes from Maddison op. cit. Before this date it is assumed that Uruguay grew at the same year-on-year rate as did our estimates of Argentine GDP per capita. GDP for Uruguay is taken from Mitchell (1993) for the period 1935-1940. Annual GDP per capita estimates 1914-1934 are calculated by assuming that Uruguay deviated from her GDP per capita trend (between the benchmark years of 1914, found in Clemens and Williamson (2000) , and 1935, found in Mitchell) in the same way that Argentina did.
Data for a small remaining number of missing years are geometrically interpolated.
Terms of Trade Index (or the Net Barter Terms of Trade -NBTT)
Existing data series were employed for the terms of trade for the US, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Austria. For the remaining countries, a NBTT series was calculated from original sources. Note that the NBTT is simply the ratio of export prices to import prices, each weighted appropriately. Mathematically, data through the use of British export data as a proxy for the imports of less developed nations. This approach is undesirable given that the composition of British exports can hardly be considered representative of the imports of developing countries as a whole, and because the use of current-year weights means that movements reflect changes in composition, not just prices. As an alternative, however, we employ a fixed index of non-primary goods from US statistics. This import index, like the British one, is country invariant. In the end, the differences are not material; the two series are almost identical (probably due to the heavy content of metals and textiles in both indices). This US manufactured export statistic is a weighted sum of the prices of textiles (55%), metals (15%), machinery (15%), building materials (7.5%), and chemicals and pharmaceuticals (7.5%). Obviously a fixed weighting for all developing nations is unrepresentative of their particular import mix (but while not representative of the specific import mix of the country, such a metric may be relevant for measuring the changing value of the country's exports versus a fixed package of manufactured products available for import. In this sense our terms of trade represent the purchasing power of local commodities in terms of richcountry goods.) Moreover, a review of each nation's external commerce documents turns up remarkably similar import compositions. For the years 1870-1900, import composition for Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India and New Zealand was examined from Statistical abstract for the several colonies and other possessions of the United Kingdom no. British self-governing dominions, colonies, possessions, and protectorates no.41-53, 1903 -1915 , Statistical abstract for the several British oversea dominions and protectorates no.54-59, 1917 -1927 , Statistical abstract for the British Empire no.60-68, 1929 -1938 , Statistical abstract for the British Commonwealth no.69-70, 1945 -1947 and Statistical abstract for the Commonwealth (trade statistics) no.71-72, 1948 -1951 Composition of main imports for reference years after 1900 for Argentina, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Siam, Uruguay comes from Die Wirtschaft des Auslandes 1900 -1927 , Berlin 1928 An Additional Note on Import and Export Price Data. UK and US prices are employed in the theory that the prices in these large, integrated and (in the UK, at least) unprotected markets would supply us with a relatively reliable "world" price index for each commodity group. A chief disadvantage of using such world price indices, however, is that home market prices in each country may diverge from the world ones in the short and even long term. This may be because of differences in product features and quality, because of variations in the composition of the products within a category, or because of less-than-perfect market integration combined with local market conditions and shocks. Kindleberger (1958) illustrates the wide divergence in the prices of bulky products such as coal and lumber between two markets as closely integrated as the US and UK. Another disadvantage of not using the home market price is the distortion created by changes in transport costs. One would prefer a terms of trade measure that is independent of transport costs. In a moment we will discuss the adjustments made to our terms of trade figures to account for transport cost changes. Such adjustments as we can make, however, cannot truly represent actual freight-adjusted prices. Overall, though, we feel the advantages of employing world price indices outweigh these disadvantages. First and foremost, home market prices are not typically on hand for the periods and countries in question. Rather, only the somewhat less desirable unit prices (calculated as the value of imports divided by the volume) are available. Second and more important, we believe UK and US market prices to be more reliable, accurate and comparable given the quality of reporting (at the time) and the quality of scholarship on these prices since then. Third, to the extent that commodity markets are well integrated worldwide, the UK and US market prices should approximate the world price. This is especially true because we are interested in price changes, not levels. To the extent that UK and US prices move in similar directions and similar magnitudes to prices in the rest of the world, these "world" price indices will more or less represent price changes relative to an index year in other nations. We believe this to be a reasonable and necessary assumption. Fourth, these foreign market price indices would have been available to (and probably used) by industrialists and policymakers throughout the period in question. Accordingly, for questions of policy response (and perhaps price setting) foreign market indices may be a more appropriate data source than home market ones. Fifth, the use of a world price index harmonizes and simplifies construction of the indices, enabling us to examine a wider sample of countries at the cost, perhaps, of precision. Fifth, by measuring both the export and import price indices in a common currency, we eliminate any inflationary bias from the figures. IND  THA  CEY  CHN  AUS  SPA  POR  PHL  COL  IDN  SRB  BRA  UK  MEX  GRC  NZD  RUS  ITA  FRA  USA  CAN  ARG  URU  TKY  GER  EGP  DEN  SWE  CHL  NOR  JPN  AHG Brazil  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Chile  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Colombia  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  74%  26%  0%  Cuba  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Mexico  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  31%  69%  0%  69%  31%  0%  Peru  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  81%  19%  0%  60%  40%  0%  Average  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  85%  15%  0%  84% 16% 0% Burma  100%  0%  0%  94%  6%  0%  82%  18%  0%  64%  36%  0%  Ceylon  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  China  94%  0%  6%  91%  0%  9%  87%  0%  13%  90%  0%  10%  Egypt  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  India  90%  0%  10%  75%  0%  25%  70%  0%  30%  72%  0%  28%  Indonesia  .  .  .  97%  0%  3%  79%  0%  21%  75%  0%  25%  Japan  100%  0%  0%  56%  0%  44%  53%  0%  47%  36%  0%  64%  Philippines  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Siam  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Turkey  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  100%  0%  0%  Average  98%  0%  2%  91%  1%  8%  87%  2%  11%  84%  4% (1) (2) (3) (4) Marginal Impact : adds up marginal effect of terms of trade using PP/X and X/GDP means as weights for the interacted terms Actual Impact : adds up actual effect of terms of trade using %ToT and sd ToT means, as well as the means of the interacted terms, that applied to the region in question. Table 3  1870-1938  1890-1938 
Latin America
Asia & the Middle East
Based on
